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Religious Belief and Religious Scepticism, by Gary Gutting, Notre Dame: Uni-
versity of Notre Dame Press, 1982. Pp. 192. 
Reviewed by GEORGE 1. MA VRODES, University of Michigan. 
"True religious faith," Gary Gutting says, "is in fact a religious scepticism 
that deflates the pretensions of both belief and nonbelief." (p. 9) This book is 
an expansion and discussion of this thesis. Gutting's main positive conclusion 
is that "the argument from religious experience does establish the existence of 
a good and powerful being concerned about us, and thus justifies a central core 
of religious belief." (p. 8) The argument for this, however, is largely confined 
to the final chapter. The rest of the book is devoted mostly to arguing that 
religious belief is in need of justification (against, e.g. Wittgenstein and Plan-
tinga), and in rejecting some other attempts to justify it (e.g., Basil MitcheJl's 
"cumulative case" argument). Along the way, Gutting argues his other main 
conclusion, "that the sort of religious belief I find justified falls far short of the 
claims of traditional religions and that detailed religious accounts of reality are 
nearly as suspect as nonreligious accounts." (pp. 8,9) 
Gutting formulates the positive evidence which he finds persuasive in terms 
of an argument from religious experience. The experience he has in mind is not 
that of spectacular "visions," etc., nor the ineffable and undifferentiated unity 
of some mystics. It is, rather, a sense of the divine presence, a consciousness 
of a being of power and goodness and love who cares for the world and for 
oneself. This sort of experience, Gutting claims, is very widespread, common 
in diverse cultures and historical periods, and it is probably the root of the 
religious faith of most ordinary believers. 
Gutting develops the argument here in a way which is reminiscent of C. D. 
Broad's briefer treatment (in Religion, Philosophy and Psychical Research). 
Drawing on C. B. Martin for "an essentially correct account of the role of 
experience," he summarizes that account as follows: 
(1) an "of-X" experience is veridical only if, supposing it to be 
veridical, we should expect, in suitable circumstances, the occurence 
of certain further experiences; (2) if these further experiences do not 
occur (given the suitable circumstances), we have no basis for accepting 
the experience as veridical; (3) if, in the relevant circumstances, the 
experiences occur, we do have a basis for accepting the experience as 
veridical; (4) if there is some reason for questioning the veridicality of 
the experience, then appeal to further expected experiences is needed 
before accepting the experience as veridical. (p. 151) 
It seems clear that, in this account, the main burden is borne by the repeatability 
of the experience and related experiences. And, says Gutting, "for some religious 
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experiences, all these expectations are fulfilled to a very high degree .. .It seems, 
then, that we can argue that religious experiences of God's presence do establish 
his existence. The experiences themselves give prima facie warrant to the claim 
that he exists, and the fulfillment of the expectations induced by the assumption 
that the experiences are veridical provides the further support needed for ultimate 
warrant." (pp. 152, 153) And Gutting then goes on to refute certain challenges 
(e.g., that of Freud) to the veridicality of such experiences. 
What beliefs such experiences warrant is another matter. Gutting observes that 
the propositional content justified here is minimal, far below the doctrinal content 
of any well-developed religion. But he also holds that minimal theism is not a 
viable religion. Religion needs a much richer account of God's nature, of his 
relation to the world and to his poople, and so on. This is the "outer belt" of 
religious belief, which surrounds the "core" of minimal theistic belief. And to 
be genuinely religious, one needs to assent to some outer belt, i.e., to immerse 
oneself in some particular religious tradition. Can that immersion be warranted? 
Here Gutting appeals to a distinction between "decisive" and "interim" assent. 
When I accept a belief decisively, then I feel no need for any further epistemic 
investigation in connection with it. I may still argue it, etc., for the benefit of 
other people, and I could abandon it if sufficient contrary evidence appeared, 
but (for the present at least, and for myself at least) I feel no need of any further 
inquiry into its truth. In the case of interim assent, however, I accept the belief 
while at the same time acknowledging the need for further investigation of it. 
And Gutting holds that we can accept the core of minimal theism decisively, 
while giving interim assent to the rich outer belt of belief associated with our 
own religious tradition. 
But how is an interim assent warranted? Apparently not, in the religious case 
anyway, by appealing to the probable truth of the belief. We do not have more 
reason for accepting the outer belt of Christian belief, for example, than that 
associated with Islam or Hinduism. ("We know just enough to call into question 
all claims to have discovered any such meaning." p. 179) But, Gutting holds, 
we can defend our interim beliefs, though not our decisive beliefs, by appealing 
to a principle of methodological conservatism. So Hindus are justified in their 
Hindu beliefs, Christians in their Christian beliefs, and so on. 
Gutting's principle of methodological conservatism is (MC) If A believes p and 
pis epistemically indeterminate for him, then he is entitled to believe p. (p. 100) 
And p is indeterminate for A in case the relevant evidence does not entitle A to a 
belief in p or to a belief in not-po 
This principle sounds much like William James' "Will to Believe" thesis, with 
two exceptions. It does not incorporate James' restrictions about the forced, 
momentous, etc., character of the options. And (MC) includes, while James 
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does not include, the "conservative" introductory clause, "if A believes p." 
Gutting gives two arguments in support of (MC). First, all of us have many 
interesting and controversial beliefs for which we do not have (and cannot 
reasonably acquire) anything like sufficient evidence. But a life of successful 
action in the world requires a large stock of just such beliefs. If, then, we are 
not to be "opportunistic vacillators or else mere onlookers" we must have such 
beliefs despite the fact that they are epistemically indeterminate for us. And 
second, "the interest of truth would be far better served by the lively conflict of 
firmly held beliefs than it would be by a general withdrawal from commitment 
on controversial issues ... So the best policy in the interests of truth is to allow, 
but not require, those who believe a proposition ... to believe it even though it is 
epistemically indeterminate for them." (p. 102) 
There are two curious features in this line of argument. The first is that there 
is nothing at all in it which tends to support the conservatism of (MC). Both the 
pragmatic need for controversial beliefs, and way in which such beliefs serve 
the "interest of truth" (I suppose that means that they conduce to vigorous 
discussions, etc., which may lead to the discovery of the truth), could justify 
my adopting a belief where 1 had none before as well as they can justify my 
continuing in a belief 1 already hold. Furthermore, it seems plausible to suppose 
that, in certain cases, these considerations would justify my abandoning a belief 
and replacing it with its opposite. For 1 might notice that the partisans who 
oppose my position on some controversial topic are few and outnumbered, so 
few that they cannot well uphold their end of the discussion. Consequently, the 
interest of truth is suffering. Gutting's second argument would then entitle me 
(though it might not require me) to abandon my previous belief and to adopt its 
opposite, in order to shore up the discussion on that side. 
If we are at all attracted to (MC), then, I cannot see why we should not delete 
its initial, conservative, clause. One of the differences between Gutting and 
James will thus disappear. 
The second curious feature is that Gutting'S arguments would seem to support, 
in a plausible way, the holding of decisive as well as interim beliefs, even when 
they are epistemically indeterminate. Gutting himself denies this (and therefore 
he must look for some other warrant for a decisive belief in minimal theism). 
But his reason seems to me to be mistaken. He observes that one who accepts 
a belief decisively thinks that no further discussions are "epistemically necessary; 
that is, necessary for the project of determining truth. "(p. 105) And he apparently 
feels that this is incompatible with believing p "because doing so is likely to 
contribute to effecting a discussion with a maximal chance of arriving at a correct 
determination of p's truth."(p. 106) But he also holds that "someone who deci-
sively assents to p may of course take part in discussions of p's truth and even 
think that such discussions are needed~.g., to lead others to believe p."(p. 
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105) And if this is so, then it is hard to see what the alleged incompatibility 
amounts to. 
What could expressions such as "the interest of truth," "the project of deter-
mining truth," and so on, mean if they do not refer to human beings discovering 
some truth, acquiring good reasons for believing some truth, etc.? Surely what 
the decisive believer holds is that he personally has no need of further discussion 
and investigation on this topic. But he can well hold that further discussion and 
investigation is necessary for a widespread and general determination of the truth 
on this topic. Just what sorts of belief will best contribute to such discussions 
is perhaps an empirical question. But it is not implausible to suppose that such 
discussions will be most vigorous and penetrating if some of the participants 
hold their beliefs in the decisive manner. In fact, this benefit may well accrue 
even if those decisive believers are mistaken about whether they themselves are 
in epistemic need of further investigation. 
In a similar way, Gutting discounts the import of his pragmatic argument for 
this topic by simply observing that "the prudential or moral goods to be attained 
by religious belief do not require decisive assent." (p. 106) No evidence is given 
for this claim. Here again it would seem to be an empirical question as to whether 
it is decisive or interim belief which best serves the man who must steel himself 
to leap over a chasm, or to choose one path rather than another on the stormy 
mountain. Or (perhaps a more interesting case) is it decisive or interim assent 
which is best for the woman who chooses this man rather than that for her 
husband? It is, at any rate, not totally implausible to suppose that there are some 
affairs of life, maybe some affairs of religious significance, in which we would 
be better off (pragmatically, at least) with decisive rather than with interim beliefs. 
If we are not attracted by (Me), Gutting's principle of methodological conser-
vatism, we will not find in this book any support for any religious belief beyond 
minimal theism. And this, as Gutting observes, is not sufficient for a viable 
religion. Without (MC), therefore, the argument of this book leaves religion in 
desperate straits. If Gutting's arguments for (MC) persuade us, on the other 
hand, then we will be hard put not to find, in them a warrant for much more 
than Gutting allows, a decisive belief in much of the detailed doctrine of some 
religious tradition. 
Subjectivity and Religious Belief, by Stephen C. Evans. Washington, D.C.: 
University Press of America, 1982. Pp. 221. 
Reviewed by LOUIS P. POJMAN, The University of Mississippi. 
Beginning with the observation that religious belief is closely bound up with 
